A little bit about what’s going on as I see it. This seems to be an outgrowth of the successful transition to a corps system of organization of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. The corps now have theaters of operation and responsibility and all non assault forces in the sectors report to the corps. The corps are responsible for defense, and offensive action is primarily handled by the independent assault regiments and brigades, with support from marine, air assault special forces and special forces unitss. Within the corps the artilllery groups, the unmanned forces brigades and in reserve the heavy brigades provide combat support for the offensive actions by the assault units. There’s some growing pains, particularly when mech units were seconded to assault regiments outside proper protocol, but it seems to be creating an environment where the mech corps can grind Russian assaults down and assault forces can ignore defense and plan counter attacks.
What this means is that Ukrainian offensive actions and counter ttacks are assuming a sustained and regular tempo, while Russian attacks are dependent upon commitment of fresh units to sectors, resulting in a varied tempo, expansive when fresh forces are committed, limited when committed forces are depleted.
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A little bit about what’s going on as I see it. This seems to be an outgrowth of the successful transition to a corps system of organization of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. The corps now have theaters of operation and responsibility and all non assault forces in the sectors report to the corps. The corps are responsible for defense, and offensive action is primarily handled by the independent assault regiments and brigades, with support from marine, air assault special forces and special forces unitss. Within the corps the artilllery groups, the unmanned forces brigades and in reserve the heavy brigades provide combat support for the offensive actions by the assault units. There’s some growing pains, particularly when mech units were seconded to assault regiments outside proper protocol, but it seems to be creating an environment where the mech corps can grind Russian assaults down and assault forces can ignore defense and plan counter attacks.
What this means is that Ukrainian offensive actions and counter ttacks are assuming a sustained and regular tempo, while Russian attacks are dependent upon commitment of fresh units to sectors, resulting in a varied tempo, expansive when fresh forces are committed, limited when committed forces are depleted.